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Abstract:  Both conventional computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and game-theoretic models
have been widely used in examining federal systems.  There has been little attempt, however, at linking
such models.  This paper describes initial work on a project aimed at developing a political-economy
CGE framework to examine fiscal federalism in Australia. Within this model we examine the incentive
system that motivates the governments at various levels and evaluate their optimal policy choices in the
equilibrium of the political economy.
Embedded in the overall political-economy model are two linked sub-models:  a conventional
multiregional CGE model of the economic sphere of the federation, and a game-theoretic (GT) model of
the political sphere.  Taxes and expenditures of each government are exogenous to the CGE model, but
endogenous to the GT model. Policy makers decisions as to optimal fiscal policies are determined in the
GT model in the light of outcomes from the economic sphere.  In other words, policy choices are made
to achieve simultaneous equilibrium in both of the two sub-models.
This paper describes our initial modelling steps.  We develop a non-numerical political-economy model.
The general equilibrium (GE) component of the model has been designed to enable it to be transformed
easily into a CGE model.  The GE component of the model covers two regions, each of which contains a
single industry producing a private and a public good, a representative household and a regional
government.  A federal government is added subsequently to the model.  The GT component assumes
that each regional government chooses its fiscal variables so as to maximize an objective function
appropriate to its jurisdiction, with the fiscal variables of the other jurisdiction treated as parameters of
the problem.  Thus we have a two-player competitive game with a government’s pay off function
represented by their objective function.  The reaction functions for each government are the first-order
conditions arising from the government maximizing its pay off.1
1.  Introduction
1
This paper describes the first steps in developing a modelling framework capable of
handling fiscal federal questions within the context of competitive federalism.
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models form one good approach for examining
such issues. There are many examples of studies using regional and multiregional CGE
models to look at fiscal federalism issues. See for example, Jones and Whalley (1989),
Dixon, Madden and Peter (1993), Madden (1993), Morgan, Mutti and Rickman (1996)
and Nechyba (1997).
However, conventional CGE models contain little, if any, optimizing-behaviour
theory relating to economic decision-making by governments. This imposes a  clear
limitation on such models for analysing competitive federalism.
An alternative modelling method would be to follow that developed by game-
theorists who have analysed decision-making by governments in a political federation in
terms of a non-cooperative, strategic-form game. Examples of this approach can be
found in Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Wildasin (1988), Hoyt (1993) and Laussel and Le
Breton (1998).
A way forward in combining the above two approaches was shown by Pant
(1997) who analysed tariff determination by means of a "mini" one-region CGE model
on to which a relationship serving to  endogenise tariff decision-making by the
government, had been grafted. We intend to develop a similar idea for analysing fiscal
federalism.  In this paper we take the first step by describing and analysing a simple two-
region GE model in which maximising behaviour is extended to regional governments.
The model put forward here is of an analytical type, but will be calibrated as a CGE
model in due course. We call this a regional political-economy GE (PEGE) model.  We
proceed in two stages.  In the first we set out a PEGE model for a single region.  This
allows us to establish notation and develop results and intuition which carry over in large
part to the two-region model, the development of which constitutes the second stage of
the work we report.
Most economies with regional governments also have a national or federal
government.  In our examination of an economy with two regions we begin by
considering a model with only regional governments.  We derive and explore the nature2
of the solution for this model both with and without government optimisation.  We then
introduce a rudimentary federal government and consider two cases; in the first the
federal government carries out a lump-sum transfer of resources from one regional
government to another and in the second it imposes lump-sum income taxes on
households and uses this revenue to make transfers to regional governments.  We
compare the solution with and without the federal government transfers and conclude
that optimising regional governments change their own tax rates to offset the effects on
their citizens of the federal government action.  But this offsetting action is only partial
since the regional governments have access only to distorting payroll taxes so that any
attempt to offset lump-sum transfers or lump-sum income taxes generates changes in the
other endogenous variables of the system such as employment, consumption and
government expenditure.  These “secondary” effects imply that the federal government
will be able to influence the optimum which each regional government can achieve for its
own region.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  We begin our account by presenting, in
section 2, a one-region GE model which we use as our starting point and go on in
section 3 to describe its conversion to a one-region PEGE model by adding optimising
government behaviour.  In sections 4 and 5 we undertake the corresponding discussion
for the two-region GE and PEGE models which were constructed from the one-region
versions.  In section 6 the model is extended to incorporate a federal government.
Conclusions are presented in the final section.
2.  The One-region CCGE Model
We begin with a one-region GE model in which there are households, firms and a
regional government.  The firms produce a single good using labour.    Households
supply the labour which firms require.  Labour is in fixed supply and we assume that the
wage adjusts to clear the labour market.  The output of the good is sold to the
households and, after costless transformation into a second good, to the regional
government.  The regional government finances its purchases of the second good by
imposing a payroll tax on the firms and distributes its purchases, free of charge, to the
households.
Both households and firms are optimizers - the representative household chooses
its purchases of the good so as to maximize utility subject to an income constraint, with3
the product-price and income taken as parameters, while the representative firm chooses
its purchases of labour services so as to maximize profits subject to a production
function constraint, with the product-price and the wage-rate taken as parameters.  Each
house hold has an equal share in the firms in its region and the firms distribute all profits
to households.
Consider the representative household first.  It maximises utility subject to a
budget constraint.  Utility depends on the consumption of the private good, C, and the
government-provided good, G.  We assume that the utility function is additively
separable in its two arguments so that it may be written as:
(1) ( ) ( ) G V C U I + = .
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Utility is maximised subject to a budget  constraint which constrains consumption to
equal income which, in turn, consists of wage income and profit income:
(3) PC = M = p + WL,
where P denotes the price of the consumption good, M denotes income,  p denotes
profits, W the wage rate and L labour supply.  The household takes both W and p (and
therefore M) as given.   There is therefore only one feasible solution to the household’s
problem:
(4)  C = M/P.
Consider now the representative firm’s problem.   The firm maximises profit, p,
defined by:
(5)  p = P(C + G) – WL(1 + T),
where G is the amount of the firm’s output supplied to the government and T is the
payroll tax rate.  We assume that production takes place only if profits are positive.
Note that we have assumed that the firm sells its output to the government and the
private sector at the same price.  Since the firm transforms output from C to G
costlessly, any difference between the price charged to the government and the price4
charged to private consumers would be inconsistent with profit maximisation.  The firm
is assumed to produce output with a single factor, labour, according to the production
function:
(6)  O = L
a ,  0 < a < 1
where O is real output:
(7) O = C + G.
A necessary and sufficient condition for profit maximisation is the standard marginal-
productivity condition:
(8)  aPL
a = W(1 + T).
This condition determines employment (labour demand) for given P, W and T.  Output
supplied is then determined via the production function (6).
Equilibrium in the labour market requires equality between demand for labour (or
employment, L) and the fixed supply of labour, L :
(9)   L L = .
The final component of the model relates to the government.  It is assumed to
satisfy the budget constraint:
(10)   PG = WLT
where the left-hand side measures the value of government expenditure and the right-
hand side revenue.  The government budget constraint implies that the government
cannot treat both T and G as instruments.  We assume that it treats T as its policy
instrument and adjusts G to satisfy (10).   G is therefore treated as endogenous and T as
exogenous in our GE model.
Note that the consumption function, (4), and the definitions of household income
and profits, (3) and (5), together imply that PG = WLT which is the government budget
constraint, (10).  Hence, one of the equations of the model is redundant and we eliminate
the government budget constraint.
We are therefore left with seven equations, (3) – (9) which can be reduced to the
following three by substitution:
(11) T L W PG =
(12) T) W(1 L aP
1 a + =
-
(13) G L C
a - =5
The variables are now  T , L W, G, C, .  We treat C, W and G as endogenous and  L P, and
T as exogenous.  Further, we choose units so that P = 1, thus treating output as the
numeraire.









Substituting (14) and P = 1 in (11) we get the solution for G as:
























Finally, from (6), (7) and (15) we get the solution for C in terms of L  and T as:
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Thus all three endogenous variables are affected by both T and L . An increase in
L  will clearly increase output and will, in turn, increase both C and G.  It will depress
the wage since, with declining marginal product of labour, a larger labour force will be
employed by profit-maximising firms only if the gross wage rate falls.  A rise in T will
also depress the wage (by approximately the same proportion as the increase in the tax
rate).  It will leave the level of output unchanged and therefore affect only the
distribution of output between C and G.  A higher tax rate results in a rise in G at the
expense of C.
2
3.  The One-region PEGE Model
The model developed in section 2 assumes that the government’s policy
instrument, T, is exogenous to the model.  While it is quite conventional to derive private
behaviour from maximising assumptions while assuming government behaviour to be
exogenous, we have argued above that this is inconsistent and we now extend the
assumption of maximisation to government behaviour and in so doing move from the
one-region GE model to the corresponding one-region PEGE model.
The first step is to decide on the government’s objective.  The literature in
regional economics identifies various objectives of regional government policy.
Common examples with counterparts in this model are employment and real output.
However, in the present model these are effectively fixed by the exogenous labour supply6
and cannot therefore be influenced by government action, making them unsuitable as
objectives of government policy.  An alternative is consumption, which  appears suitable
since it is subject to government influence and it is a source of utility.  However, it is not
the only source of utility – the government also influences household welfare via
government-provided goods.   Thus we take the government’s objective function as the
maximised value of the household’s utility, i.e. equation (1) with C and G evaluated at
their utility-maximising levels.
The constraints facing the government are assumed to be the structure of the
economy as captured by the model set out in the previous section.  Hence, we replace C
and G by their solutions derived in section 2.  Thus there is some asymmetry in the way
in which households, firms and government are treated: the government knows the way
in which households and firms will react to changes in T and G but we assume that firms
and households take T and G as given and ignore the government’s own maximising
behaviour.
There are two variables which may be used for government instrument, viz., T
and G.  However, as pointed out in the previous section, the government is subject to a
budget  constraint which precludes it from using both independently.  We assume
arbitrarily but for reasons of convenience that the government uses T as its instrument
and that it allows G to vary to satisfy its budget constraint, equation (10).
The government’s objective is, therefore to choose T to maximise:
(1)   V(G) U(C) I + =
subject to the equations of the GE model.  Substituting for C and G using the solutions
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The first-order condition may be rewritten to give:


























, (18) implies that at the optimum:
(19) U V ¢ = ¢7
The optimal T will be positive and  (under reasonable conditions) less than unity.
To show that it will be positive we argue as follows. With a positive labour
supply, output will be positive so that, given the properties of the utility function, (19)
can be satisfied only if both C and G are positive so that both U' and V' are finite.  With
G positive the government’s budget constraint ensures that T will be positive.
We argue that T will be less than unity as long as the labour share in output is
greater than 50%.   From the definition of profits, equation (5), the product-market
clearing condition, (7), and the production function, (6), our assumption that in











 is less than 2 at the
optimum, i.e. so long as the optimal labour-share exceeds 0.5.
3
4.  The Two-Region GE Model
We turn now to the two-region models which correspond with the one-region
models presented in sections 2 and 3, respectively.  In this section we develop the two-
region counterpart of the GE model presented in section 2.  In the next section we
convert this into a PEGE model thus obtaining the two-region counterpart of the one-
region PECGE model of section 3.
4.1  The Model
At the outset we need to make assumptions about the nature of inter-regional
relations.  We assume that each regional economy is identical to the one-region one we
set out in section 2 except that we allow the possibility of inter-regional migration so that
regional labour supplies are not fixed.  Instead, we assume that the national labour force
is fixed and that households migrate (costlessly) between regions in response to inter-
regional wage differentials.  In equilibrium, therefore, the wage is equalised across
regions.
It may be argued that our modelling of households is inconsistent – households
are assumed to choose their consumption to maximise a utility function dependent on
both C and G but make their location decision based only on W – in effect on C alone.  A8
theoretically preferable alternative would be to assume that households choose their
location to maximise the same utility function as is used to motivate their consumption
choice.  In that case the equilibrium condition for inter-regional migration would be
U(C1) + V(G1) = U(C2) + V(G2)
where subscripts refer to regions.  While preferable theoretically, this would greatly
complicate the analysis.  Not only does it introduce four endogenous variables; it also
makes the equilibrium dependent on the form of the utility function.  At this stage we use
the simpler assumption of wage inter-regional wage equality in the interests of
tractability.
We assume that households reside in the region in which they work and they
receive government goods provided by the regional government in that area.  We
therefore abstract from inter-regional spillovers in the provision of government goods.
We further assume that the ownership of firms is not inter-regionally transferable so that
firms are owned by households living in the region in which the firm is located and that
households receive profit distributions only from firms in the region in which they live.
Under these assumptions the two regional economies are replicas of the single-
region economy of section 2 except for inter-regional labour flows.  Hence equations
(11), (12) and (13) apply to both regions (with the fixed labour supply assumption
relaxed and P = 1):
(20) i i i i T L W G = i = 1,2
(21) ( ) i i
1 a
i T 1 W aL + =
- i = 1,2
(22) i
a
i i G L C - = i = 1,2
To these equations we add:
(23) L     L     L 2 1 = + , and
(24) W1 = W2
where L  is national employment.  
Relationships (20) – (24) constitute our two-region GE model.  This is a set of
eight relationships in eleven variables.  The eleven variables are:   L , Gi (i=1,2),  Wi
(i=1,2), Li (i=1,2), Ci (i=1,2) and Ti (i=1,2).  We take  L  and Ti (i=1,2) as exogenous
leaving  Gi (i=1,2),  Wi (i=1,2), Ci (i=1,2) and  Li (i=1,2), as the eight endogenous
variables.9
4.2  The Solutions























































From (24) it follows that the resulting expression will also be the solution for W2.
























Finally, we obtain the solutions for C1 and C2 (in terms of L1 and L2 respectively).  From
(20), (22) and (27) we get:
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Arguing along the same lines we get the solution for C2:

















4.3  The Multipliers
While we are not interested in the GE model per se, we derive several multipliers
at this stage of the analysis since they will be useful in the analysis of the two-region10
PEGE model to be developed in the next section.  Besides, they can be used to throw
some light on the implications of moving from the single-region to the two-region model.
Multipliers can be derived for each of the endogenous variables with respect to each of
the exogenous variables but, given the nature of our interests, we restrict the derivation
to multipliers for the region-1 variables with respect to T1.  Similar results can be derived
for the second region.
Consider L1 first.  The multiplier for L1 with respect to T1 can be derived by







































































  < 0,
where the negative sign follows immediately from the fact that  b = 1/(a-1) and the
restriction that 0 < a < 1 so that  b < 0.  Since output is monotonically related to
employment, a rise in T1 reduces not only employment in the region but also output.
The multiplier for W1 with respect to T1 follows from the following expression
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where the sign of the multiplier again follows from the restrictions on a (and the sign of
the multiplier for L1).   Hence a tax rise in region 1 depresses wages in both regions.
The effect on G1 of a change in the tax rate in region 1 follows from the
differentiation of (28) with respect to T1 to give:
(34)




























We have already established that ¶L1/¶T1 is < 0.  From this it follow that the second term
in (34) is negative (assuming once again that T1 and T2 are positive).  The first term,
however, is positive.  Consequently, unlike the multipliers of L1 and W1 with respect to
T1, the sign of the multiplier of G1 with respect to T1 is indeterminate.11
Finally consider the effects of a tax change on consumption expenditure.  From
(20), (21) and (22) we have:
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where the negative sign follows from the restriction that 0 < a < 1 and the sign of
¶L1/¶T1.
Recall that in the 1-region GE model, a rise in the payroll tax rate leaves output
unaffected (since it is determined by the fixed supply of labour) but reduces the wage and
redistributes output from consumption to the government good. In the present region, in
contrast, output is also affected.  This is because a rise in region 1’s tax rate “initially”
depresses the wage in region 1, causing labour to migrate to region 2 in search of higher
wages.   This reduces employment and output in region 1 and increases employment and
output in region 2.  The effect in region 1, therefore, is both to reduce output and to
redistribute output from C to G.  These effects ensure an unambiguous effect on C1 but
produce an ambiguous effect on G1 as shown by the multipliers in  equations (34) and
(35).
The effects of the tax rise on wages and employment are illustrated in Figures 1
and 2.  Figure 1 shows the initial equilibrium. The length of the horizontal axis, O1O2
represents the fixed national labour supply.  Wages are measured up the vertical axes –
W1 along the left-hand axis and W2 along the right-hand axis.  The two curves are the
marginal product curves adjusted for the presence of the payroll tax.  In equilibrium the
tax-adjusted MPL must be equal to the wage in each region and the immigration
condition is that wages are equalised across the two regions.  Hence equilibrium is
represented by the wage W1* = W2* where national employment is distributed to the two
regions as O1E and EO2 respectively.
In Figure 2 we show the effects of an increase in the tax rate in region 1 from T1
to T1’ which shifts its MPL curve down to MPL/(1+T1’). The result is a reduction in the
wage rate from W1* to W1*’ which causes migration of labour to region 2 so that
employment in region 1 falls to O1E’ and employment in region 2 increases by the same12
amount.  The fall in the wage is smaller than in would be in the absence of migration in
which case the wage in region 1 would have fallen to W1*”.  Thus, in the two-region
model, there are spillover effects on region 2 of a tax rise in region 1and, while region 2
“gains” in terms of increased employment (and population), it “loses” in terms of a lower
wage.
5.  The Two-Region PEGE Model
We now extend the model of the previous section to include optimisation on the
part of the two regional governments and so move to the two-region PEGE model.  We
assume, as in the one-region case, that each regional government chooses its own payroll
tax rate to maximise the welfare of its own citizens.  We also assume that in solving its
maximisation problem each government is constrained by the set of relationships
constituting the GE model determining consumption and government expenditure in its
own region.  Each government is assumed to take the tax rate in the other region as
given so that the resulting equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium.
5.1  The Optimizing Relationships
Our discussion of the relationships defining the regional governments’ optimal
tax-rates will be conducted throughout in terms of region 1.  A parallel discussion holds
for region 2.
The government of region 1 chooses T1 to maximise:
(36) ) V(G ) U(C I 1 1 1 + =
subject to the solutions for C1 and G1 derived from the GE model in section 4, equations
(28) and (30) with L  1 replaced by the expression in (25) and T2 and  L  treated as
























The terms ¶C1/¶T1 and ¶G1/¶T1 are simply the relevant multipliers derived from the GE
model in the previous section.  On substituting these expressions, equations (34) and
(35), the first-order condition for the government’s problem can be written as:13
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The coefficient of ¶L1/¶T1 on the right-hand side of (38) is positive and we have
seen in section 4 that  ¶L1/¶T1 itself is negative so that the right-hand side of the
condition for the optimal value of T1 is negative.  Hence at the optimum U' < V'.
The requirement that U' < V' at the optimum is in contrast to the single-region
case where the government’s maximising condition is that U' and V' are equal.
4  In the
case without inter-regional migration T determines only the division of a given output
between C and G.  Hence, an increase in tax increases G and decreases C by the same
amount so that at the optimum the welfare benefit of the increase in G (V') must be
exactly offset by the welfare foregone from lost consumption (U').
Once inter-regional migration is permitted there is an additional effect of a tax
change.  Now a change in tax affects not just the distribution of given output between C
and G but affects the level of output itself.  In particular, an increase in T1 results not
only in a shift of output from C1 to G1 but also in a reduction in output in region 1.
Hence the cost in terms of consumption foregone of a given increase in G is greater than
it is in the no-migration case so that at the welfare optimum the welfare effects are
balanced only if U' < V'.
In the single-region case we argued that the optimal tax rate is positive (since G
is positive at the optimum) and, under reasonable conditions, less than unity.  The same
argument may be applied to the present model so that we may conclude that the optimal
payroll taxes rates fall between 0 and 1.
The complete two-region PEGE model consists of 10 equations: two optimality
conditions of the form of (38) and the solution equations for Li, Gi, Ci and Wi given by
equations (25)-(31).  The system has 10 endogenous variables (Ti, Gi, Ci, Li and Wi,
i=1,2) with a single exogenous variable, L.
Before turning, in section 6, to an examination of the reaction of optimising
regional governments to the policy actions of a federal government, we briefly explore
the effects within the present model of a shock to national labour supply, L .
We concentrate on the effects on employment in region 1.  From the solution for


























where the partial derivatives are simply the multipliers for L1 with respect to L , T1 and
T2.  It follows from inspection of equation (25) that the first of these,  ¶L1/¶L , is
positive, from our analysis in section 4 that the second is negative and, again, from
equation (25) that the third is positive.  That is, a rise in national labour force increases
employment in both regions in the absence of regional government action and a tax rise
in one region results in the movement of employment from that region to the other.
Hence the first term in (39) will tend to increase employment in region 1 but the effects
of the others on dL1 depend on the regional governments’ reactions.
The government in region 1 observes the “immediate” effect of an increase in L
being an increase in employment in its own region which is accompanied by an increase
in output and in consumption.  To maintain its  optimality condition it will need to
increase G1 to balance the effect on household welfare of the increase in C1.  This does
not necessarily require an increase in the payroll tax rate since the tax base will have risen
with the increase in output.
5  Hence, the equilibrium effects on the regional tax rates is
indeterminate and will depend on the precise forms of U and V.   A similar argument may
be applied to region 2.
6.  The Two-Region PEGE Model with a Federal Government
The PEGE model developed in the two preceding sections has two optimizing
regional governments but no federal government.  We now introduce a federal
government which uses its authority to modify the equilibrium generated by the regional
governments’ optimizing strategy.  We consider two possibilities.
The first is that the federal government takes from one regional government some
of the output which it has purchased for distribution to households in its region and gives
it to the other regional government.  The second possibility is that the federal
government imposes a lump-sum tax on households in both regions and uses the
combined proceeds to purchase outputs of the transformed from the two regional
governments.  The output so purchased it then distributes, on a lump-sum basis, directly
to households in each of the two regions.15
6.1  Lump-sum Inter-governmental Transfers
Denote the output transferred to the government of region 1 by the federal
government by TR1 and the output transferred to the government of region 2 by TR2.
They satisfy:
(40) 0 TR TR 2 1 = +
We add this relationship to the relationships of the GE model and treat TRi (i=1,2) as
exogenous.
The question we now consider is:  How will a federal-government intervention of
the type now under discussion change the equilibrium generated by the two-region
PEGE model of sections 5 and 6 and, in particular, how are the regional governments
likely to react?
We focus on the two regional government optimising conditions of the form of
(38). We begin by noting that we need to distinguish between the amount of output
purchased by regional government i and that distributed to the households in region i.
We continue to use the notation Gi to refer to government purchases so that the amount
consumed by citizens of region i is now Gi + TRi.  With this interpretation of Gi none of
the solution expressions for Li, Wi, Ci and Gi given by equations (25)-(31) is affected by
the introduction of the federal governments transfers. Hence the private sector will
respond to the federal government re-distribution only if the regional governments
change their tax rates.  Whether they do will be governed by their optimising conditions.
Consider case of region 1.  Equation (38) may be written as:









































The optimising T1 must satisfy this condition both before and after a federal-government
intervention of the type described.  Suppose that 
*
1 T  is the tax rate which satisfies the
condition before the lump-sum transfer.  It will no longer satisfy (41) after the transfer
since the argument of V' is now  (G1 + TR1) and if we assume that the transfer is from
region 2 to region 1 so that TR1 > 0, we find that after the transfer V'/U' will be less than
the right-hand side of (41) at the original taxes rates.  Hence,  the optimality condition
for region 1’s government is violated at unchanged tax rates.16
To restore optimality it will need change its tax rate so as to increase C1 or
reduce G1 or both. Both of these will be achieved by a reduction in T1.  The opposite is
true for region 2 since TR2 will be negative.  Hence the government in region 2 will need
to increase the payroll tax rate to restore optimality.
We can conclude, therefore, that the reactions of the regional government to the
federal government re-distribution will move in the direction of offsetting the effects of
the transfer.  Optimising regional governments will therefore undo (at least part of) the
actions of  the federal government.  But, they will not be able to completely undo the
federal government’s action since that would require a fall in G1 equal to TR1.  But the
tax change necessary to achieve the fall in G1 will also increase C1, reducing U', so that
not all of the adjustment can be in G1, some of the adjustment necessarily being in C1.
This reflects the fact that the federal government has available a lump-sum transfer while
the regional governments have only distorting payroll tax instruments.
The above argument contains two omissions which should be noted by way of
qualification.  In the first place, it ignores the fact that if TR1 > 0, then TR2 < 0 and T2





ratio.  Likewise, no account is taken of the fact that the fall in T1 will work against the






Secondly, no account is taken of the fact that both the fall in T1 and the rise in T2
will have effects on the right-hand side of the equalities set out in (41) as well as on the
left-hand side.
6.2  Lump-sum Income Taxes and Transfers
We turn now to the second type of federal government intervention distinguished
at the outset.  This is where the federal government uses its authority to impose a lump-
sum income tax on households in each of the two regions.  It then uses the proceeds of
the tax to purchase output of the transformed good from the regional governments.
Finally it distributes this output directly to regional households on a lump-sum basis.
Denote the lump-sum income tax imposed on households in region i by Fi (i=1,2)
and the lump-sum transfers of the transformed good to households in region i, by GFi
(i=1,2).  These four variables are linked by the federal government’s budget constraint:17
(42) F1 + F2 = GF1 + GF2
We continue to denote the output purchased by the regional government by Gi so
that the regional government budget constraint remains as before:
Gi = TiWiLi
As in the lump-sum-transfer case, the introduction of GFi does not affect the solutions
for Ci, Gi, Wi and Li at given payroll tax rates.  The only change is that the amount of
government good consumed by residents of region i is now (Gi+GFi).  
The introduction of the lump-sum income tax does, however, change the
consumption of the private good since it reduces the amount of income households have
to spend.  Private consumption expenditure is now
Ci = Oi – Gi – Fi = Li
a - TiWiLi  – Fi
As in the previous case, condition (41) must hold both before and after the
federal government intervention.
6  Suppose, again, that 
*
1 T  is the tax rate which satisfies
the condition before the federal government’s action.  Will it continue to be optimal after
the federal government policy? The answer is “No” for two reasons.   The first is similar
to that given in the simpler case of a transfer – the new argument of V' is now G1+GF1
so that V' is now “too low” (assuming that GFi is positive).  The second reason is that
the argument of U' is now the original Ci less Fi so that U' is “too high” (assuming that Fi
is positive).  Both of these changes require a rise in T1 to restore optimality for region 1.
Thus in the tax and transfer case, the federal government not only provides goods
to the citizens of region 1 which skews the distribution of output towards the
government good (requiring an offsetting action by the regional government) but it also
raises taxes on the citizens of region 1 which further skews the allocation of output
towards the government good, requiring a further shrinking of the regional government
to maintain optimality for the citizens of region 1.  The federal government essentially
does what the regional government also does – transform  taxes into the government
good – and to maintain a welfare maximum the regional government reduces its
operations in response to the federal government’s attempt to redistribute output from
private consumption to government consumption and from one region to another.  As in
the simple transfer case, the offsetting action of the regional governments will not be
perfect because of the differences in the nature of the instruments available at the two
levels of government.18
Exactly the same argument holds for region 2.  Thus, in the case of the
intervention now under discussion both regional governments will need to reduce their
labour tax if they are to remain in an optimal situation.  This is in contrast to the case of
federal intervention analysed in section 6.1 where one regional tax needs to fall and the
other to rise.
It will be recalled that the argument developed in section 6.1 for the lump-sum-
transfer case of federal intervention was subject to two qualifications which were noted.
Similar qualifications apply here.  Once again our argument ignores the effect of the fall
in T2 (T1) on region 1’s (region 2’s) situation, though here the effect will be supportive
rather than offsetting.  Likewise no account is taken in the argument that both the fall in
T1 and the fall in T2 will have effects on the right-hand side of the two relationships set
out in (41), as well as on the left-hand side.
8.  Conclusions
This paper set out to build a small regional genera equilibrium (GE) model and
extend it to include optimising behaviour on the part of regional governments.  The
motivation for this research was the observation that standard models assume optimising
behaviour on the part of private agents (firms and households) but assume government
behaviour to be exogenous.  In this paper we assumed, instead, that regional
governments choose their policy instruments so as to maximise the utility of the
representative household.
We started by describing a single-region model in which the government raises
tax revenue from a payroll tax which it uses to purchase output from the firms and which
it provides free of charge to households.  We derived the condition for optimal
government policy and found that it involves the equality of the marginal utility of the
private good and that of the government-provided good.  This follows from the property
of the model that changes in the tax rate simply redistribute a given output from private
consumption to government consumption.
When the model was extended to two regions, the  optimality condition was
adjusted to take account of the effects of inter-regional migration.  In the two-region
model a change in tax not only shifts output from the private to the government sector
but also affects the total amount of output produced as workers migrate in response to
inter-regional wage differentials.19
The final section of the paper introduced a federal government which attempts to
change the distribution of resources between the regions by lump-sum tax and transfer
mechanisms.  We found that the optimising regional governments operate to frustrate the
redistributional aims of the federal government but they are only partially successful in
doing so since their taxes have  allocational consequences.  Hence, there is still a
redistributional role for a federal government even though the possibilities are more
limited and there may be unintentional consequences when they face optimising regional
governments.
One of our proposed extensions of the work described here is to replace this
rudimentary treatment of the federal government with optimising behaviour. In this
connection the work of Boadway and Keen (1997) will be taken as a starting point.
NOTES
1 The research reported in this paper was supported by a SPIRT Grant from the Australian Research Council.
2 The multiplier for G with respect to T is dG/dT = aL
a(1/1+T
2)>0.  Since output is unaffected by a rise in T, C
must fall.
3 To understand why a production-parameter constrains the feasible tax-rate, consider a case where the
equilibrium labour-share is 0.3.  In that case a 200% tax on wages is consistent with positive profits – wages
will account for 30% of the value of output, taxes for 60% of the value of output and profits will still be positive
at 10% of the value of output.  However, once the labour share rises to 0.5 a tax-rate of over 100% would result
in negative profits, the possibility of which has been ruled out.
4 Note that if labour is not inter-regionally mobile (i.e., ¶L1/¶T1 = 0) condition (38) reduces to U' = V'.
5 The tax base is W1L1 = [a/(1+T1)]O1 which is clearly increasing in output, O1. However, since tax revenue is
T1[a/(1+T1)]O1 the increase in tax does not absorb all the increase in the value of output.
6 Note that C1 also appears on the right-hand side of (41).  However, in the derivation of (41) this was
introduced when aC1/L1 was substituted for [(1+T1(1-a)/(1+T1)]aL1
a-1 which is not affected by the federal
intervention.
References
Boadway, R. and Keen, M. 1997.  Efficiency and the Optimal Direction of Federal-State
Transfers in D.E.  Wildasin (ed.). Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 168-193.
Dixon, P.B., Madden, J.R. and Peter, M.W., 1993. “The Effects of Reallocating General
Revenue Assistance Among the Australian States”, Economic Record 69(207),
367-381.
Hoyt, W.H, 1993. “Tax Copetition, Nash Equilibria, and Residential Mobility”, Journal
of Urban Economics 34(3), 358-79.
Laussel, D. and  Le Breton, M., 1998. “Existence of Nash Equilibria in Fiscal
Competition Models”, Regional Science and Urban Economics 28(3), 283-96.20
Madden, J.R., 1993. “The Economics of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: An Applied General
Equilibrium Approach”, Australian Tax Forum 10(1), 75-90.
Morgan, W., Mutti, J. and  Rickman, D., 1996. “Tax Exporting, Regional Economic
Growth, and Welfare”, Journal of Urban Economics 39, 131-159.
Nechyba, T., 1997. “Computable General Equilibrium in Local Public Finance and Fiscal
Federalism”, in D.E.  Wildasin (ed.). Fiscal Aspects of Evolving Federations,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 168-193.
Pant,  H.M., 1997. Tariff Determination in the General Equilibrium of a Political
Economy.  Ashgate Aldershot.
Wildasin, D.E., 1988. “Nash Equilibria in Models of Fiscal Competition”, Journal of
Public Economics 35(2), 229-40.